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use#LAAThe Post-Bellum  Recovery  of the South and 
the Cost of the Civil War: Comment 
In a recent article in this JOURNAL  we estimated the impact of the Civil 
War  and  related  events,  by  constructing  a  hypothetical  consumption 
stream-one  which would have existed in the absence of the war. ' The "cost 
of the war" to the North and to the South was computed by comparing this 
consumption  stream  to  the  one  actually achieved.  A  very  large  figure, 
especially for the  South,  resulted  from this  procedure,  and we  then  at- 
tempted to decompose it. We attributed one large portion of the total cost to 
direct outlays on  the  conflict and a second  major component  to physical 
destruction. We suggested that much of the remaining figure was the result 
of factors associated with the war, such as emanicipation, trade disruption, 
and the  demise  of the plantation economy. 
Peter Temin has criticized our procedure in "The Post-Bellum Recovery 
of the  South and the Cost of the  Civil War," by focusing on two possible 
components of our cost to the South. The first is the decline in work effort of 
former slaves, and the second is the retardation in the demand for cotton as 
calculated by Gavin Wright.2 Our paper contains an explicit estimate of the 
first cost, for which our upper bound value of $1.96 billion is only 21 percent 
of our estimated  total cost  to  the  South.3 We  did not  detail the  second 
component,  and according to  Temin,  our neglect  of  this has  led  to  our 
overstating the cost of the Civil War to the South by a factor of four. Temin's 
conclusion, however,  is not based on an explicit calculation using Wright's 
data. He  assumes,  instead,  that even  in the absence of the Civil War per 
capita consumption  would  have  fallen  to  its  actual 1879 level  of  $62.03 
instead of increasing to $110.48, as we assumed.4 Temin justifies this conclu- 
sion by stating that "the wartime devastation in the South had been repaired 
long before the end of the 1870's, . . . [therefore] there does not seem any 
reason to assert that the  level  of southern income  and consumption was 
depressed  after 1879 because  of the  Civil War."5 
Journal of Economic History, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2 (June 1978). Copyright ?  The Economic 
History Association. All rights reserved. 
We thank Gavin Wright for his comments. 
1 C. Goldin and F.  Lewis, "The Economic Cost of the American Civil War: Estimates and 
Implications," THE  JOURNAL  OF  ECONOMIC  HISTORY,  35 (June 1975), 299-326. Note that we do 
not claim to be measuring only the cost of destruction from the Civil War but also the costs of 
related events,  such as emancipation. The title of our original paper has misled some readers, 
and we emphasize here  that we are using the phrase "economic cost of the Civil War" very 
broadly. 
2  P. Temin, "The Post-Bellum Recovery of the South and the Cost of the Civil War," THE 
JOURNAL  OF  ECONOMIC  HISTORY,  36 (Dec.  1976), 898-907, and G. Wright, "Cotton Competi- 
tion and the  Post-Bellum  Recovery  of the  American South," THE  JOURNAL  OF  ECONOMIC 
HISTORY,  34 (Sept.  1974), 610-35. 
3  Goldin and Lewis,  "Economic Costs," pp.  315 and 317. 
4  Temin,  "Post-Bellum Recovery," p.  906. 
5  Ibid.,  p. 905. Temin's assumption about hypothetical consumption in 1879 is not only ad 
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Rather than  assume  full  recovery  by  1879  as  does  Temin,  we  have 
explicitly estimated the impact on hypothetical southern consumption of the 
supposed slowdown in world demand for cotton.  Our calculation does not 
indicate that we have greatly inflated the costs attributable to factors asso- 
ciated with the Civil War, but reasserts our initial conclusion that such costs 
were very large. 
The value of southern cotton production in  1859 was $197.6  million or 
$23.15 per capita, and it grew from 1839 to 1859, at a per capita rate of 3.56 
percent per year.6 Had that growth rate continued after 1859, the value of 
cotton output in 1879 would have been  $46.64 per capita or $596.9 million 
for the entire South. Gavin Wright's research indicates, however,  that the 
actual level  of demand did not increase at its prewar rate and was only 46 
percent of what would have been achieved in 1879 had demand continued to 
increase at that rate. In per capita terms demand in 1879 was only 49 percent 
of its hypothetical level.7 Our estimate of the loss in consumption from this 
retardation in cotton demand is computed by comparing the actual demand 
for cotton to a hypothetical demand,  one growing at the prewar rate, and 
computing the  difference in income  between  these  two cases for 1879. 
The market for cotton in 1879 is depicted  in Figure 1, where  Dh is the 
hypothetical cotton demand curve assuming the (per capita) prewar demand 
shift continued;  Da is the actual cotton demand curve,  assuming Wright's 
data are correct; and S is the cotton supply curve. The shaded area, P0P1BA, 
represents the impact on hypothetical income in the South of the reduction 
in the rate of increase in cotton demand. If the supply and demand curves 
hoc but is also contradicted by some facts about the capital stock. In 1860 the (non-slave) capital 
stock was $3.485 billion, that is $399 per capita. Our estimate for 1870 is $2.477 billion and the 
1880 Federal Census gives a value for the capital stock of $4.506 billion or $346 per capita. The 
1880 per capita figure is 13 percent less than that for 1860 and far less than a hypothetical value 
which assumes the capital stock would have continued to grow at its prewar rate. (See Goldin 
and Lewis, "Economic Cost," accompanying "Notes," pp. xvii-xix. All values are expressed in 
1860 dollars.) 
6  Robert Gallman, "Commodity Output,  1839-1899," in National Bureau of Economic Re- 
search, Trends in the American Economy in the Nineteenth Century,  Studies in Income and 
Wealth, vol.  24 (Princeton,  1960), pp.  43 and 46.  All values are in  1860 dollars. 
7  The prewar demand curve estimated  by Wright is: 
Q =  kP-1099, where k =  k*e 0.054t 
(Wright, "Cotton Competition," p. 631, Table 7, assumption 1). Between  1859 and 1879 cotton 
output increased by 21.4  percent  and its  relative price increased by 6.5  percent  (Gallman, 
"Commodity Output,  1839-1899," pp.  43,  46 and 47).  By applying Wright's estimate of the 
elasticity of cotton demand, -1.099,  we derive an actual increase in the level of cotton demand 
of 30 percent over this period. However, if one extrapolates the prewar demand curve forward 
for 20 years, (at 5.4 percent per year) one gets a hypothetical level of demand in 1879 which is 
186 percent greater than the 1859 level. Therefore the actual level of demand in 1879 was only 
45 percent of its hypothetical value. This same calculation in per capita terms results in a larger 
figure because the rate of population growth in the South fell after 1859. Note that converting 
demand curve shifts to per capita terms changes only slightly the relationship between  actual 
and hypothetical demand. In no way does this conversion imply a dependence  of cotton demand 
on southern population growth. Furthermore, the per capita value, 49 percent,  is appropriate 
for our purpose since in our original article the hypothetical consumption stream was based on 
per capita prewar growth rates. Post-Bellum  Recovery  489 
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THE  MARKET FOR COTTON 
are assumed to be of constant elasticity,  this area can be  expressed  as: 
AnY  =  QP1Q1  da  _  1] 
where  vj,y =  elasticity of demand (absolute value),  supply of cotton, 
dash =  actual, hypothetical level  of demand for cotton, 
AY =  change in income. 
8 This equation is derived by integrating over the supply curve. For a similar derivation see 
Goldin and Lewis, "The Role of Exports in American Economic Growth during the Napoleonic 
Wars, 1793 to  1807," in R. Caves,  D.  North,  and J. Price,  editors,  Exports and Growth in 
Economic History  (Princeton: Princeton University  Press, forthcoming). 490  Goldin and Lewis 
Substituting  the  hypothetical  value  of  cotton  in  1879,  P'Q1,  and 
the  percentage  of  the  hypothetical  level  of  demand  actually  achieved, 
(I),  gives: 
v+1 
$596.9  milonY-  AY=(  +  9 m  on_)  [(0.4943)  -  11. 
Our estimates of AY given in Table 1 are based on Wright's calculation of 
the prewar elasticity of cotton demand (1.099) and are computed for three 
values of y. 
TABLE  1 
THE  IMPACT ON INCOME  IN THE  SOUTH (1879) OF THE  DECLINE 
IN THE  RATE OF GROWTH OF COTTON DEMAND 
(for  three cotton  supply  elasticities) 
Temin's 
y = 0  y=  1  y = 3.5  Estimate 
AY  (millions)  -$282.50  -$145.90  -$66.10 
AY  per capita  -22.08  -11.40  -5.16 
Revised  hypothetical 
per capita  consumption  88.40  99.08  105.32  62.03 
a Our  original  estimate  of hypothetical  per capita  consumption  was $110.48. It is assumed 
that the loss in income caused  an equal loss in consumption. 
We can now recompute the "indirect cost of the Civil War," that is, the 
value of foregone consumption discounted to 1860 from the Civil War and 
related  events,  using  Temin's  assumption  that  the  prewar  demand  for 
cotton grew at Wright's estimated post-war rate. All that is required is a 
hypothetical per capita consumption stream, and to compute this we have 
assumed that the 1860 to 1879 rate of growth implied by the figures in Table 
1 would have continued to 1899. The post-1899 growth rate is assumed to be 
equal to the pre-Civil War rate. The results of this computation are given in 
Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
REVISED  "INDIRECT COST OF THE  CIVIL WAR" TO THE  SOUTH 
(excluding  cost due to loss of life) 
Supply Elasticity  Cost (billions of 1860 $ in 1861) 
y=  0  5.3100 
y= 1  7.2957 
f=  3.5  8.4970 
Our Original  Estimate  8.9695a 
Temin's  Estimate  2.1596b 
a This figure  is from  Table  5 of Goldin  and Lewis, "The Economic  Cost,"  p. 314. 
b This is Temin's  per capita  cost multiplied  by the population  of the South  in 1860. Post-Bellum  Recovery  491 
Contrary to Temin's conclusion,  Wright's findings on cotton demand do 
not substantially alter our calculations. We  did not magnify the  economic 
cost attributable to the Civil War by four times.  Even the extreme case of 
y=O does not reverse the main qualitative findings of our paper. The more 
reasonable values of y =  1 and y = 3.5 generate essentially the same results. 
Furthermore,  these  revised  estimates  of  the  cost  of the  war are  almost 
certainly biased downward for the following three  reasons. 
1.  We have assumed that the  entire  reduction in the  rate of growth in 
cotton demand (including the domestic  demand) was completely  indepen- 
dent of the war. 
2.  We have not included the increase in consumers' surplus to southern 
cotton consumers, resulting from the lower cotton price. These two biases are 
probably quite  small, but a third may not be. 
3.  We have assumed that had the value of cotton production per capita 
continued to grow at its prewar rate, 3.56 percent per year, then per capita 
consumption  in  the  South  would  have  grown  at  its  prewar  rate,  1.30 
percent per year. Between  1839 and 1859 cotton's income share increased 
from 17 percent to about 27 percent. Therefore had per capita cotton output 
increased after the war at its prewar rate, the growth of per capita southern 
income  would almost certainly have accelerated.9 
TABLE 3 
COMPONENTS  OF THE  "INDIRECT COST OF THE  CIVIL WAR" TO THE  SOUTH 
Indirect  Cost (billions of 1860 $ in 1861)  9.48a 
(1) Direct  Cost  3.29  [34.7]b 
(2) Cost due to Emancipation  1.96  [20.7] 
(3) Cost due to the  Decline  in Rate of 
Growth in  Demand for Cotton  1.67c [17.6] 
(4) Residual  2.56  [27.01 
a  This  includes  the cost due to loss of life. 
b  Terms in brackets indicate the percentage  of the indirect cost. 
c This value corresponds to an elasticity of supply of cotton equal to one. 
Source: Goldin and Lewis,  "The Economic  Cost," pp.  308,  315,  and 317. 
We can now divide our measure of the "indirect cost of the Civil War"  into 
four main components:  the  direct cost  of the  war including physical and 
human capital destruction, the cost due to a reduction in the labor supply of 
freedmen, that is due to emancipation, the cost due to the decline in the rate 
of growth in  demand for cotton,  and a residual.'0  Our allocation of these 
9  For example, if we assume that both the value of cotton and non-cotton outputs had each 
continued to grow at their per capita prewar rates, then per capita consumption would have 
increased at 1.62 percent per year, not at 1.30 percent per year as we have assumed in our 
paper. Per capita consumption in 1879 would then have been $117.40. Reducing this figure by 
the  effect of the  slowdown in cotton demand from Wright's data gives  the following results: 
yO  y  1  y  3.5  Our  Original  Estimate 
Hypothetical 
per capita  95.32  106.00  112.25  110.48 
consumption 
in 1879 
10 Note that this does not imply that the retardation in the demand for cotton was caused by 492  Goldin and Lewis 
costs is given in Table 3.  Despite  the fact that components (2) and (3) are 
almost certainly overstated,  the  residual is  still large-27  percent  of our 
original indirect cost. When we combine the residual with the direct cost of 
the war, we are forced to conclude that although the two factors discussed by 
Temin played a role in depressing income  after 1865, the  enormous cost 
incurred by the South in terms of reduced consumption should be attributed 
primarily to factors associated with the war. 
CLAUDIA  GOLDIN,  Princeton University 
FRANK D.  LEWIS, Queen's University, Ontario 
the Civil War. This is merely a convenient way of allocating our original measure, the indirect 
cost of the war. These four factors, related or not to the war, all resulted in lower per capita 
consumption. 